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INTRODUCTION 
On April 18, 1938, the Arkansas and Oklahoma state police 
stopped Jack Miller and Frank Layton, two washed-up Oklahoma 
bank robbers. Miller and Layton had an unregistered sawed-off 
                                                          
 
* Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. J.D., New York University School of Law, 
2005; M.F.A., San Francisco Art Institute, 1997; B.A, University of California, Berke-
ley, 1995. Research funded in part by the Institute for Humane Studies. 
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shotgun, so the police arrested them for violating the National Fire-
arms Act (“NFA”). Surprisingly, the district court dismissed the 
charges, holding the NFA violates the Second Amendment.1 The 
Supreme Court reversed in United States v. Miller, 2 holding the Sec-
ond Amendment does not guarantee the right to keep and bear a 
sawed-off shotgun as a matter of law.  
Seventy years later, Miller remains the only Supreme Court 
opinion construing the Second Amendment.3 But courts struggle to 
decipher its holding. Some find Miller adopted an individual right 
theory of the Second Amendment, some find it adopted a collective 
right theory, and some find it adopted a hybrid theory, protecting 
the right to possess a firearm in connection with militia service.4 
Most recently, in Parker v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit con-
cluded Miller assumed the Second Amendment protects an individ-
ual right to possess and use weapons “’of the kind in common use 
at the time,’” including handguns.5 
Oddly, Second Amendment scholars have largely ignored 
Miller. While individual and collective right theorists alike claim 
Miller supports their position, most provide only a perfunctory ac-
count of the case. The few exceptions focus on the text of the opin-
ion, rather than the history of the case, and the context in which it 
was decided.6 All conclude Miller is an impenetrable mess. 
                                                          
 
1 United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1939), rev’d, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
2 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
3 Of course, other cases mention or allude to the Second Amendment. See, e.g., David 
B. Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has 
Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99 (1999). 
4 For the individual right theory, see Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 
(D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001). For the 
collective right theory, see Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 
103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976). For the hybrid theory, see Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 
185 F.3d 693, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1274 & 
n.18 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996); Love v. 
Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019-
20 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977); Cases v. 
United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942). 
5 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Miller, 307 
U.S. at 179) (emphasis omitted), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007). 
6 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller’s Tale: A Reply to 
David Yassky, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (2002). 
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This essay suggests the conventional wisdom is only half-
right, because Miller did less than generally supposed. Part I pre-
sents a brief historiography of Miller. It argues scholars have not 
provided an entirely convincing account of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Miller, largely because they focus on the original mean-
ing of the Second Amendment. Part II recounts the history of the 
case. It shows Jack Miller was a career criminal and government 
informant. It finds Miller was a Second Amendment test case ar-
ranged by the government and designed to support the constitu-
tionality of federal gun control. And Part III analyzes Miller in light 
of this history. 
This essay concludes that Miller is coherent, but largely ir-
relevant to the contemporary debate over the meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment. Miller was a Second Amendment test case, teed 
up with a nominal defendant by a district judge sympathetic to 
New Deal gun control measures. But the Supreme Court issued a 
surprisingly narrow decision. Essentially, it held that the Second 
Amendment permits Congress to tax firearms used by criminals. 
While dicta suggest the Second Amendment guarantees an individ-
ual right to possess and use a weapon suitable for militia service, 
dicta are not precedent.7 In other words, Miller did not adopt a the-
ory of the Second Amendment guarantee, because it did not need 
one. 
I. THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF UNITED STATES V. MILLER 
Originally, courts and commentators alike found Miller in-
scrutable,8 or maybe just unremarkable. In any case, they basically 
ignored it. In 1939, legal scholars were uninterested in anachro-
nisms like the right to keep and bear arms. But as gun control be-
came increasingly controversial, scholars began to debate the mean-
ing of the Second Amendment and the nature of the right to keep 
and bear arms. Eventually, they produced remarkably sophisticated 
                                                          
 
7 See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006). 
8 See, e.g., Cases, 131 F.2d at 922 (“However, we do not feel that the Supreme Court in 
this case was attempting to formulate a general rule applicable to all cases. The rule 
which it laid down was adequate to dispose of the case before it and that we think 
was as far as the Supreme Court intended to go.”). 
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and comprehensive competing accounts of its origins and ratifica-
tion. 
Second Amendment scholarship reflects the bitterly parti-
san politics of gun control. Opponents of gun control generally en-
dorse an individual right theory, claiming the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to possess and use firearms. Advocates 
generally endorse a collective right theory, claiming it protects a 
collective right to form a militia. Both theories find substantial sup-
port in the text and history of the Second Amendment. 
Unusually, for Second Amendment scholars, text and his-
tory are everything. Individual and collective right theorists alike 
focus on the original meaning of the Second Amendment, carefully 
parsing its origins, drafting, ratification, and implementation in the 
early republic. Indeed, originalism uniquely dominates Second 
Amendment scholarship.9  
Why? Maybe the focus on originalism is tactical. Maybe it is 
strategic. Collective right theorists, in particular, may find original-
ist arguments less “embarrassing” than the alternatives.10 Second 
Amendment scholarship does highlight the Talmudic niceties of 
constitutional law: Why is this right different from every other 
right? And maybe it is just circumstantial. After all, without clear 
precedents, what is left but original meaning? Regardless, courts are 
obliged to follow Miller, as far as it goes, whatever the Second 
Amendment originally meant. 
Of course, both individual and collective right theorists still 
claim Miller supports their position. Individual right theorists gen-
erally emphasize that the Court addressed the merits of Miller’s 
Second Amendment claim, rather than dismissing it for lack of 
standing.11 Some go further, and argue Miller simply failed to show 
                                                          
 
9 “For some reason, virtually everyone on both sides of the pro- and anti-gun Second 
Amendment debate tends to focus on text and history.” Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The 
Second Amendment as a Window on the Framers’ Worldview, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 597, 599 
(1998). 
10 See generally Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 
637 (1989) (noting Hobson’s choice Second Amendment presents gun control sup-
porters committed to the Bill of Rights). 
11 See, e.g., Denning & Reynolds, supra note 6, at 2. 
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short-barreled shotguns have military uses.12 Collective right theo-
rists highlight the Court’s conclusion the Second Amendment 
“must be interpreted and applied” with the end of preserving the 
militia in view and argue the Second Amendment simply protects 
the right to serve in the militia.13 Many note the absurd conse-
quences of holding the Second Amendment protects only military 
firearms, rather than those actually used by civilians.14 In the end, 
it’s a stalemate. On its face, Miller does not clearly adopt either the-
ory of the Second Amendment. 
II. THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. MILLER 
A. JACKSON MILLER AND THE O’MALLEY GANG 
Jackson “Jack” Miller15 was a gambler, roadhouse owner, 
and small-time hood from Claremore, Oklahoma.16 Born in about 
1900, he grew into a hulking, 240-pound thug.17 By 1921, he was in 
trouble with the law.18 His troubles worsened on August 14, 1924, 
when he accidentally killed H.A. Secrest, a young court reporter 
from Tulsa, while working as a bouncer at the Oak Cliff Resort near 
Claremore.19 Secrest was plastered and roughing up his date, so 
Miller decked him, breaking his jaw.20 Unfortunately, Secrest died 
                                                          
 
12 See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 109 (1987). 
13 See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: 
The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 420 (2000); and David 
Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 588 (2000). 
14 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, in THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 247, 250 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000). 
15 Also known as “J. J. Miller.” Gilmore v. United States, 124 F.2d 537, 538 (10th Cir. 
1942). 
16 O’Malley Gang Trial Witness Slain, MUSKOGEE DAILY PHOENIX, April 6, 1939, at 1. 
17 Miller was one-eighth Cherokee, and Oklahoma police called him a “big, yellow 
punk.” Officers Continue Without Clues In O’Malley Gang Witness Slaying, MUSKOGEE 
DAILY PHOENIX, Apr. 7, 1939, at 1. See also Claremore Man is Found Slain in Gang Kill-
ing, TULSA DAILY WORLD, Apr. 6, 1939, at 1; Robber Suspect to Get Immunity, TULSA 
DAILY WORLD, Nov. 26, 1935, at 20. 
18 See State v. Miller, CR-21-03077B (D. Okla. Nov. 23, 1921). 
19 Blow on Jaw Caused Death of Tulsa Man, OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 29, 1924, at 18.  
20 Id. 
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of septicemia a couple of weeks later.21 Miller turned himself in on 
September 11, 1924, and immediately posted $5,000 bail.22 
But Miller did not hit the major leagues until he joined the 
O’Malley Gang in 1934. The Depression was the golden age of  
Midwestern bank robbery, and the O’Malleys executed some of the 
era’s most daring and successful heists. From 1932 to 1935 they 
claimed “most of the major bank robberies in the Southwest,” hit-
ting banks in Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and Illinois.23 Originally 
known as the Ozark Mountain Boys, the gang consisted of a score of 
hoods, most of whom met in the Missouri State Penitentiary. A re-
porter christened them the O’Malley Gang after the dashing Leo 
“Irish” O’Malley, notorious for his sensational but remarkably inept 
kidnapping of August Luer. In fact, O’Malley was only a bit 
player. 24  The gang’s real leaders were Dewey Gilmore, Daniel 
“Dapper Dan” Heady, and George Leonard “Shock” Short.25 
In the summer of 1934, Short moved to a rented farmhouse 
outside of Claremore.26 The rest of the gang soon followed. Heady 
recruited Miller as a “follow-up man” (lookout) and “wheelman” 
(getaway driver).27 Then the O’Malleys got to work. On September 
14, 1934, they hit the McElroy Bank and Trust in downtown Fa-
yetteville, the oldest bank in Arkansas. While Miller and Art Austin 
circled the block, Gilmore, Heady, Virgil “Red” Melton, and Fred 
Reese broke into the bank before it opened, shanghaied the employ-
ees as they arrived, and made off with about $5,700.28 
Then, on December 22, 1934, the O’Malleys robbed two 
Okemah, Oklahoma banks at the same time, one of the few success-
                                                          
 
21 Id. 
22 Alleged Oak Cliff Guard Surrenders, OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 12, 1924, at 1. 
23 Robert E. Bates, Irish O’Malley and the Okemah Caper, 12 OKLAHOMBRES 1, 3-6 (2001). 
24 What’s more, “Leo O’Malley” was the alias of Walter Holland, who was born Wal-
ter Riley and adopted his foster parents’ surname. See R.D. Morgan, Irish O’Malley 
and the Ozark Mountain Boys (unpublished manuscript, on file with the NYU Jour-
nal of Law and Liberty). 
25 Short was the wayward son of a prominent Galena, Missouri family and the 
brother of Missouri Congressman Dewey Short. 
26See Morgan, supra note 24. 
27 Robber Suspect to Get Immunity, supra note 17. 
28See Morgan, supra note 24. $5,700 in 1934 dollars is the equivalent of about $88,686 
in 2007 dollars. See U.S. Department of Labor, The Inflation Calculator, 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Sept. 6, 2007). 
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ful double heists in American history.29 They drove a Plymouth and 
a Ford into Okemah at dawn, wore bandages concealing their faces, 
and struck shortly before the banks opened.30 Gilmore, O’Malley, 
Short, and Russell Land Cooper hit the Okemah National Bank, 
while Heady, Melton, and Reese hit the First National Bank of 
Okemah.31 Miller “was stationed at the Okemah city limits to guard 
against possible breakdowns and to pick up members of the gang if 
their autos failed.” 32  Armed with pistols and machineguns, the 
O’Malleys bound and gagged the unsuspecting bank employees as 
they arrived, then forced a bank officer to open the safe. The 
Okemah National Bank yielded $13,186 and the First National Bank 
of Okemah yielded $5,491.25.33 The police pursued, to no avail.  
Miller returned to Claremore with his $2,100 share of the 
Okemah job, half of which he kicked back to Gilmore on the sly.34 
But he soon grew restless. On the night of January 11, 1935, he and 
some friends decided to rob Joe Lewis’s gas station and café in Sa-
lina, Oklahoma. Nineteen-year-old Percy Bolinger was alone behind 
the counter when Miller, Earnest Tennyson, Ray Anderson, Nor-
man Hoch, Howard Bridwell, Cap Ellis, Bill Meyers, and Blue 
Culver sauntered in at about 2 a.m. They ordered coffee and started 
playing the slot machines. When they got unruly and started tilting 
the machines, Bolinger asked them to leave. The hoods returned a 
few hours later, accompanied by Jeff Armstrong, who promptly 
pistol-whipped Bolinger. They stole $23.71 from the till and $120 
from four slot machines, which they dumped in Lake Cherokee.35 A 
week later, the police arrested the whole crew in Claremore.36 It was 
the beginning of the end for the O’Malleys.  
                                                          
 
29 Five Bank Bandits to Trial Monday, TULSA DAILY WORLD, Nov. 24, 1935, at 6; Five to 
Face Trial in Raid, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 24, 1935, at 22. Today, Okemah is best known 
as Woody Guthrie’s hometown. 
30 See Morgan, supra note 24. 
31 Gilmore v. United States, 124 F.2d 537, 538 (10th Cir 1942).  
32 O’Malley Gang Trial Witness Slain, supra note 16, at 4. 
33 Gilmore, 124 F.2d at 538. 
34 Robber Suspect to Get Immunity, supra note 17; O’Malley Gang Trial Witness Slain, 
supra note 16, at 4. 
35 Armstrong v. State, 68 P.2d 114, 114-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1937). 
36 Id. at 115. 
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On May 3, 1935, the O’Malleys hit the City National Bank of 
Fort Smith, Arkansas, stealing about $22,000.37 It was their last big 
job. The police arrested Cooper as a likely suspect and struck gold. 
Cooper ratted out Gilmore, who was already on the lam. The police 
caught up with Gilmore on May 22, outside of Lancaster, Texas.38 
Gilmore sang too, fingering the rest of the gang. The police pinched 
O’Malley and Heady in Kansas City, where they’d rented a swanky 
pad from James Maroon.39 O’Malley immediately confessed to the 
Luer kidnapping and was extradited to Illinois.40 But the FBI took 
Heady to Muskogee, Oklahoma, to face federal charges on the 
Okemah job.41 A couple of weeks later, the police nabbed Short in 
Galena, Missouri.42 And on August 8, they caught up with Melton 
and Reese at a fishing camp in Taney County, Missouri.43 The FBI 
took all three to Muskogee for trial.44  
In the meantime, federal prosecutors indicted the 
O’Malleys in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.45 The Oklahoma 
trial came first. Federal prosecutors charged Gilmore, Cooper, 
O’Malley, and Short with robbing the Okemah National Bank and 
Heady, Melton, and Reese with robbing the National Bank of 
Okemah.46 All seven pleaded not guilty and the trial was set for Oc-
tober 16. But on October 2, the United States re-indicted the lot of 
them, added Jack Miller to both counts, and postponed the trial to 
November 25.47 Miller soon flipped, confessing to his role in the 
Okemah job and turning state’s evidence.  
                                                          
 
37 Five Bank Bandits to Trial Monday, supra note 29, at 6; Five to Face Trial in Raid, supra 
note 29, at 22; Robber Suspect to Get Immunity, supra note 17; Luer Kidnapping Leader is 
Seized in Kansas City, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 1, 1935, at 3; Federal Officers Will Attend 
Trial, TULSA DAILY WORLD, November 24, 1935, at 6; Irish O’Malley and the Okemah 
Caper, supra note 23; see also Morgan, supra note 24. 
38 Five Bank Bandits to Trial Monday, supra note 29, at 6; Morgan, supra note 24. 
39 Luer Kidnapping Leader is Seized in Kansas City, supra note 37; Morgan, supra note 24. 
40 See Morgan, supra note 24. 
41 See id. 
42 Federal Officers Will Attend Trial, supra note 37, at 6. 
43 Morgan, supra note 24.  
44 Federal Officers Will Attend Trial, supra note 37, at 6. 
45 Gilmore v. United States, 124 F.2d 537, 538 (10th Cir. 1942); Gilmore v. United 
States, 129 F.2d 199, 201 (10th Cir. 1942). 
46 Gilmore, 124 F.2d at 538; Gilmore, 129 F.2d at 201. 
47 Gilmore, 129 F.2d at 201; Okemah Bank Holdup Trial Begins Today, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 
25, 1935, at 9. 
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Miller was the government’s ace in the hole. To preserve 
the surprise, federal prosecutors sequestered him in the county jail 
until trial.48 As soon as the trial began, Miller’s lawyer H. Tom 
Kight announced, “Jack Miller, my client, will testify only on condi-
tion that he be granted complete immunity.”49 Judge Robert L. Wil-
liams agreed, on the condition Miller “gives a complete and truthful 
account of the crime.”50  
He did, and then some. “Miller, placed on the witness 
stand, identified the defendants as coconspirators and testified Dan 
Heady, charged with participation in the robbery of the First Na-
tional bank approached him ‘regarding robbery of some banks.’ He 
testified the plan of robbing the Okemah banks was agreed upon 
and he was employed as a ‘follow-up man.’ He said he received 
$2,100 as his share of the loot taken from the banks.”51 Miller’s 
erstwhile companions branded him a “squealer,” Cooper even re-
questing to leave the courtroom while Miller testified.52  
The trial was over almost as soon as it started. On Novem-
ber 27, the jury convicted the seven defendants on all counts.53 Wil-
liams acquitted Miller as promised, but added an admonishment. 
“You had a narrow escape this time . . . and you won’t be so lucky 
again. Get into something honest and quit this gambling busi-
ness.”54 Miller immediately returned to Claremore.55 
Williams set a sentencing date of December 9, 1935. But on 
December 3, Heady’s wife “Pretty Betty” slipped him a pistol dur-
ing a visit. Heady used the pistol to break out of prison, escaping 
                                                          
 
48 Five Bank Bandits to Trial Monday, supra note 29, at 6; O’Malley Gang Trial Witness 
Slain, supra note 16, at 4. 
49 Robber Suspect to Get Immunity, supra note 17. Kight was a sometime state legislator 
from Claremore, elected as a Democrat to represent Rogers County in 1919, 1927, 
1929, 1931, 1933, 1937, 1939, 1943. See  Simpson v. Hill, 263 P. 635 (Okla. 1927).  
50  Robber Suspect to Get Immunity, supra note 17; Okemah Bank Hearing Ends, 
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 27, 1935, at 2. 
51 Robber Suspect to Get Immunity, supra note 17. 
52 O’Malley Gang Trial Witness Slain, supra note 16, at 4. 
53 Gilmore v. United States, 124 F.2d 537, 538 (10th Cir. 1942); O’Malley Gang Trial 
Witness Slain, supra note 16, at 4. 
54 Okemah Bank Convictions Heard, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 28, 1935, at 23; O’Malley Gang 
Trial Witness Slain, supra note 16, at 4. 
55 Three Convicted of Bank Robbery, TULSA DAILY WORLD, Nov. 28, 1935, at 8; O’Malley 
Gang Trial Witness Slain, supra note 16, at 4. 
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with Gilmore, Short, and Cooper, among others. During the jail-
break, Heady shot Muskogee Chief of Detectives Ben Bolton, who 
died a couple of days later.56 A huge posse of Oklahoma police and 
federal agents, aided by bloodhounds and observers in airplanes, 
tracked the fugitives to Pushmataha County into the Kiamachi 
Mountains near Clayton, Oklahoma.  
On December 5, the posse caught Cooper while he was 
walking down a country road twelve miles north of Clayton.57 And 
the next day, they found Heady and Gilmore in a farmhouse near 
Weathers, Oklahoma. When Heady and Gilmore refused to surren-
der, the police opened fire, killing Heady. Gilmore quickly gave up 
and led the police to Short, about a mile and a half away. Short was 
already dying, having been critically burned in an accidental fire 
the night before, and he drowned when a boat used to evacuate him 
accidentally capsized.58 On December 9, Williams sentenced Gil-
more, Cooper, O’Malley, Melton, and Reese to 25 years.59 
Miller was terrified of the fugitive O’Malleys, so the FBI 
held him in a county jail during the manhunt.60 They needed their 
snitch alive for the Arkansas trial. On January 10, 1936, federal 
prosecutors charged Dewey Gilmore, Russell Cooper, Otto Jackson, 
and Floyd Y. Henderson with robbing the McElroy Bank and Trust 
Company of Fayetteville and the City National Bank of Fort Smith, 
Arkansas.61 At first, all four pleaded not guilty, but Gilmore flipped 
when Miller implicated him in the Fayetteville job, and the others 
quickly folded.62 On January 14, Judge Hiram Heartsill Ragon sen-
tenced Gilmore, Cooper, and Jackson to 25 years, and Smith to 
                                                          
 
56 Four Are Slain in Day’s Toll of Prison Escapes, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Dec. 4, 1935, 
at 1; Tenn. Fugitive Captured After Mountain Chase, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 
1935, at 11. 
57 Tenn. Fugitive Captured After Mountain Chase,, supra note 56; Kill Fugitive, Shoot An-
other; Find One Dying, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, Dec. 7, 1935, at 12. 
58 Kill Fugitive, Shoot Another; Find One Dying, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE, supra note 57. 
Short was very popular in Galena - over 1,000 people attended his funeral - and his 
death was controversial. The police denied shooting him, but a Galena undertaker 
insisted he found several buckshot wounds in the corpse. See Morgan, supra note 24. 
59 Gilmore v. United States, 124 F.2d 537, 538 (10th Cir. 1942); Gilmore v. United 
States, 129 F.2d 199, 201 (10th Cir. 1942). 
60 Claremore Man is Found Slain in Gang Killing, supra note 17, at 1. 
61 Gilmore v. United States, 131 F.2d 873, 873-74 (8th Cir. 1942). 
62 Officers Continue Without Clues In O’Malley Gang Witness Slaying, supra note 17, at 4. 
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twelve.63 And on February 14, Gilmore and Cooper got another 99 
years for murdering Bolton.64  
That was the end of the O’Malleys. Melton, Cooper, Gil-
more, and Reese started in Leavenworth and ended up in Alca-
traz.65 O’Malley did his time in Illinois, but soon went mad and 
died in 1944. And Miller returned to his penny-ante ways. In 1937, 
the United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company sued him for the 
proceeds of the Okemah job, to little effect.66 Eventually, he fell in 
with Frank Layton, another small-time Claremore hood.67  
On April 18, 1938, the Arkansas and Oklahoma state police 
stopped Miller and Layton outside of Siloam Springs, Arkansas, en 
route from Claremore.68 They had an unregistered, short-barreled 
shotgun in the car and apparently were “making preparation for 
armed robbery.”69 So the police arrested them.70 
B. MILLER IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
Miller and Layton ended up in Fort Smith, Arkansas, where 
United States Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas Clinton 
R. Barry charged them with violating the National Firearms Act. 
Barry knew all about Miller, as he had attended the O’Malley trials 
                                                          
 
63  Crime, CHIC. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 19, 1936, at A8; O’Malley Gang is Sentenced, 
OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 15, 1936, at 16. 
64 Two of O’Malley Gang Get 99 Year Sentences, CHIC. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 16, 1936, at 18. 
65 Several members of the O’Malley Gang ultimately served time in Alcatraz: Dewey 
E. Gilmore # 301, Russell Land Cooper # 304, Donnie Garrett # 314, Fred Reese # 321, 
Virgil Melton # 381. Letter from R.D. Morgan to author (May 10, 2005) (on file with 
author). 
66 Return of $11,647 In Loot is Sought, OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 12, 1937, at 21. 
67 Layton was affiliated with Robert Trollinger of the Cookson Hills Gang and did 
time in the 1920s for helping the Henry Starr Gang rob a bank in Maize, Oklahoma. 
See Morgan, supra note 24. 
68 Firearms Test Case Probable at Ft. Smith, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Jan. 4, 1939, at 2; Telegram 
from Clinton R. Barry, United States Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas, 
to the Attorney General of the United States (Apr. 23, 1938) (National Archives and 
Records Administration), 
69 Telegram from Clinton R. Barry, United States Attorney for the Western District of 
Arkansas, to the Attorney General of the United States (Apr. 23, 1938) (National Ar-
chives and Records Administration),  
70 Indictment, United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, No. 3926 (W.D. Ark. June 2, 
1938); Indictment, United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, No. 3926 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 
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and seen Miller testify.71 Barry was eager to ensure the government 
could prove an NFA violation. It is “[e]xtremely important this case 
be investigated by competent federal officers quickly before these 
parties released on bond to prove possession this weapon in Okla-
homa immediately before arrest in Arkansas to show transporta-
tion.” 72  The United States Attorney’s office forwarded Barry’s re-
quest to the F.B.I. for investigation. 73 
Miller was scheduled to appear before the district court in 
Fort Smith during its next term, which began June 6, 1938.74 While 
in prison, Miller returned to form, ratting out Joel Carson for mur-
dering a hospital security guard in Little Rock, Arkansas.75 On May 
3, 1938, District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas Hiram 
Heartsill Ragon set Miller’s bail at $2,000,76 which D.A. Blackburn of 
Clarksville, Arkansas posted on May 16, 1938.77 
On June 2, 1938, Miller and Layton were both indicted on 
one count of violating 26 U.S.C. § 1132(c) by transporting an un-
taxed short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce.78 Both Miller 
and Layton pleaded guilty, but Ragon refused to accept their plea 
and appointed Paul E. Gutensohn as counsel.79 On June 11, 1938, 
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OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 17, 1939, at 25; Richard W. Stevens & Aaron Zelman, The U.S. v. 
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Miller and Layton demurred to the indictment, claiming that it pre-
sented insufficient evidence of a transfer requiring payment of a tax 
and challenging the constitutionality of the NFA under the Second 
and Tenth Amendments.80 Surprisingly, Ragon immediately issued 
a memorandum opinion sustaining the demurrer and quashing the 
indictment. He held that the NFA violates the Second Amendment 
by prohibiting the transportation of unregistered covered firearms 
in interstate commerce.81  
United States v. Miller immediately became the first Second 
Amendment test case.82 On September 21, 1938, Miller and Layton 
were both re-indicted on one count of violating 26 U.S.C. § 1132(j) 
for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in inter-
state commerce.83 On January 3, 1939, Miller and Layton demurred 
again, claiming the NFA registration and taxation provisions violate 
the Second Amendment.84 Ragon immediately re-issued the same 
memorandum opinion. 85  Miller and Layton were free men and 
promptly disappeared. The next day, Governor Bailey appointed 
Gutensohn to finish the term of State Senator Fred Armstrong, who 
had died on December 10, 1938.86 The appointment sparked a po-
litical firestorm.87 
C. NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT 
Enacted in 1934, the National Firearms Act taxed the manu-
facture, sale, and transfer of short-barreled rifles and shotguns, ma-
chine guns, and silencers; required registration of covered firearms; 
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82 Firearms Test Case Probable at Ft. Smith, supra note 68; National Firearms Act May Be 
Attacked as Invalid, ARK. GAZETTE, January 5, 1939, at 2. 
83 Indictment, United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002, No. 3926 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 21, 
1938). 
84 Demurrer to Indictment, United States v. Miller, 26 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Ark. 1939). 
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and prohibited interstate transportation of unregistered covered 
firearms.88 Nominally, it was a revenue act, levying a $200 transfer 
tax on all covered firearms, as well as an annual license tax of $200 
on dealers, $300 on pawnbrokers, and $500 on manufacturers. In 
practice, it produced little revenue because it imposed prohibitive 
rates, often many times the value of the covered firearms.89  
Of course, the NFA was really a ban disguised as a tax, in-
tended to discourage the possession and use of covered firearms. 
“The gangster as a law violator must be deprived of his most dan-
gerous weapon, the machine gun.”90 Modeled on the Harrison Nar-
cotics Act, the NFA made covered firearms risky and expensive.91 
“We certainly don’t expect gangsters to come forward to register 
their weapons and be fingerprinted, and a $200 tax is frankly pro-
hibitive to private citizens.”92 The Act was quite successful. While 
many people registered NFA firearms, 93  few legitimate dealers 
could afford to pay the license tax and even fewer legitimate buyers 
were willing to pay the transfer tax.94 For example, Oklahoma po-
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lice saw dealers search for ways to get rid of NFA firearms.95 The 
Tommy Gun Era was soon over.96 
The NFA was a product of a long-standing push toward 
federal regulation of firearms. In 1927, Congress prohibited mailing 
most handguns, with limited success.97 Several bills introduced in 
1930 would have prohibited the transportation of certain firearms in 
interstate commerce. 98  But Attorney General Homer Cummings 
supported the NFA because it relied primarily on the tax power, 
ensuring its constitutionality.99 
As originally proposed, the NFA also applied to pistols and 
levied a $1000 tax on manufacturers and importers. However, after 
the NRA and other firearms associations opposed the inclusion of 
pistols at the public hearings, the restrictions on pistols were elimi-
nated.100 The Ways and Means Committee approved the bill with-
out reservation, and the Finance Committee recommended amend-
ing the tax on manufacturers and importers to $500, which the 
House accepted.101 Congress explicitly disclaimed any intention to 
include “pistols and revolvers and sporting arms” because “there is 
justification for permitting the citizen to keep a pistol or revolver for 
his own protection without any restriction.”102 
Some gun control opponents suggested that the NFA was 
“sponsored by people who wish to compel all sportsmen to register 
their firearms and store them in armories when they are not being 
used for hunting or target purposes.”103 But even they generally 
conceded the Second Amendment permits federal regulation of ma-
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chine guns and other ‘gangster weapons.’104 “No person outside our 
national defense units and police has any legal use for such weap-
ons because they have no sporting or hunting value, being made for 
the sole purpose of taking human life.”105 
But Cummings was not content with the NFA. The New 
York Times reported that he considered federal regulation of pistols 
“the national government’s next step in the war against crime,”so in 
1936 he circulated a proposed bill imposing a $1 transfer tax on pis-
tols and requiring registration.106 The gradual expansion of federal 
gun control met with growing opposition. Thousands of gun own-
ers wrote to the Ways and Means Committee objecting to the Fed-
eral Firearms Act, some invoking the Second Amendment.107 Never-
theless, on June 30, 1938, Congress passed the Federal Firearms Act, 
regulating interstate commerce in firearms.108 
D. JUDGE RAGON  
The newspapers assumed Miller was a “test case of the Na-
tional Firearms Act.”109 They were probably right. The government 
needed a Supreme Court precedent holding that federal gun control 
does not violate the Second Amendment. Ragon teed up the case.  
Ragon did not really think the NFA violated the Second 
Amendment, and probably colluded with the government to create 
the ideal test case. His opinion is peculiar on its face, begging for an 
appeal. A memorandum disposition is appropriate when deciding a 
routine case, but not when holding a law facially unconstitutional. 
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And Ragon was the first judge to hold that a federal law violates the 
Second Amendment, even disagreeing with a Florida district court 
that had dismissed a Second Amendment challenge to the NFA.110  
Before he became a judge, Ragon represented the Fifth Dis-
trict of Arkansas in Congress from 1923 to 1933.111 As a congress-
man, he was a vocal advocate of federal gun control. In 1924, Ragon 
introduced an unsuccessful bill prohibiting the importation of guns 
in violation of state law,112 and vigorously supported another bill 
prohibiting the mailing of most pistols, which eventually passed in 
1927.113  
Basically, Ragon wanted to prohibit firearms used by 
criminals, including pistols.114 “I want to say that I am unequivo-
cally opposed to pistols in any connection whatever. If you want 
something in the home for defense, there is the shotgun and the 
rifle, but a pistol is primarily for the purpose of killing some-
body.”115 And he specifically dismissed Second Amendment objec-
tions to federal gun control. “I cannot see that violence to the Con-
stitution which my friend from Texas sees in this bill.”116 If Arkan-
sas could prohibit pistols, so could the United States.117 
A prominent Democrat, Ragon endorsed Roosevelt in 1932 
and helped push the New Deal through the Ways and Means 
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Committee.118 In return, Roosevelt made him a district judge.119 The 
NFA was part of Roosevelt’s New Deal program, enacted with 
broad support shortly after Ragon took the bench.120 But the Federal 
Firearms Act of 1938 was stirring up popular opposition, much of it 
based on the Second Amendment.121 The government needed to 
silence the complaints, and Miller was the perfect vehicle. Ragon 
had presided in an O’Malley prosecution, so he knew Miller was a 
crooked, pliable snitch, who wouldn’t cause any trouble. And 
Gutensohn was a comer who knew the game and got his due. 
Ragon’s memorandum opinion presented no facts and no argu-
ment. With no defense muddying the waters, it was the govern-
ment’s ideal test case. 
E. MILLER IN THE SUPREME COURT 
The test came quickly. On January 30, 1939, Barry appealed 
Miller directly to the Supreme Court.122 Embroiled in the contro-
versy concerning his contested appointment to the Arkansas State 
Senate,123 Gutensohn did not object.124 The Supreme Court accepted 
the government’s appeal.125  
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As usual, the Solicitor General’s office drafted the govern-
ment’s brief.126 In the absence of precedent, the government could 
not anticipate what theory the Court would adopt. Accordingly, it 
offered several reasonable but inconsistent arguments supporting 
the constitutionality of the NFA. 
The government began by claiming the Second Amend-
ment does not grant a new right, but prohibits Congress from in-
fringing a common law right.127 So what common law right does the 
Second Amendment protect? The government argued the Second 
Amendment “refers to the militia, a protective force of government; 
to the collective body and not individual rights.”128 In any case, it 
only guarantees the right to keep and bear arms “for lawful pur-
poses,” and certainly does not protect weapons used by crimi-
nals.129 The NFA affects “weapons which form the arsenal of the 
gangster and desperado,” and the Second Amendment “does not, 
we submit, guarantee to the criminal the right to maintain and util-
ize arms which are particularly adaptable to his purposes.”130 
Supreme Court Clerk Charles Cropley wrote to Gutensohn 
on March 15, informing him the Supreme Court had accepted the 
appeal and expected to hear oral argument on March 31.131 Guten-
sohn wrote back on March 22, asking why he had not received the 
record or the government’s brief and emphasizing that he repre-
sented Miller and Layton pro bono.132 Cropley replied on March 25, 
informing Gutensohn that the government had submitted a type-
written brief and he could do the same. In the alternative, Cropley 
suggested the court could postpone oral argument until April 17. 
                                                          
 
126 See Warner W. Gardner, Pebbles From The Path Behind, reprinted in 9 GREEN BAG 2d 
271, 273 (2006) (noting the Solicitor General’s office generally had to draft briefs from 
scratch in appeals from the criminal division). 
127 Brief for the United States at 8-9, United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (No. 
696) (“The Second Amendment does not confer upon the people the right to keep 
and bear arms; it is one of the provisions of the Constitution which, recognizing the 
prior existence of a certain right, declares that it shall not be infringed by Congress. 
Thus the right to keep and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution and 
therefore is not dependant [sic] upon that instrument for its source.”). 
128 Id. at 21. 
129 Id. at 20. 
130 Id. at 7, 8. 
131 Letter from Charles Elmore Cropley to Paul E. Gutensohn (March 15, 1939). 
132 Letter from Paul E. Gutensohn to Charles Elmore Cropley (March 22, 1939). 
2008]                     The Peculiar Story of U.S. v. Miller 67
But on March 28, Gutensohn replied by telegram: “Suggest case be 
submitted on Appellants brief. Unable to obtain any money from 
clients to be present and argue case = Paul E Gutensohn.”133 He was 
probably relieved to be rid of Miller and Layton. 
On March 30, 1939, seven justices of the Supreme Court 
heard oral argument in United States v. Miller. Chief Justice Hughes 
was ill,134 and the newly appointed Justice Douglas was not con-
firmed until April 4. Gordon Dean represented the United States 
and no one represented Miller or Layton.135 Two days later, Guten-
sohn finally received four copies of the government’s brief.136  
The decision came quickly. On May 15, 1939, Justice James 
Clark McReynolds “drawled from the bench: ‘We construe the 
amendment as having relation to military service and we are unable 
to say that a sawed-off shotgun has any relation to the militia.’”137 
The unanimous vote was 8-0, as Justice Douglas was recused.  
The papers were bemusedly pleased. The New York Times 
noted, “The record in the case of Miller and Dayton [sic] does not 
show for what purpose they were taking the sawed-off shotgun 
across State lines. Government officials felt, today, however, that 
the McReynolds decision had given them a new instrument with 
which to fight bank robbers, gangsters and other criminals, whose 
favorite arm is the sawed-off shotgun.”138 And Jackson soon asked 
Congress to enact legislation requiring the registration of all fire-
arms, in order to foil subversives:139 “’It is to be particularly noted 
that the legislation, the enactment of which I recommend, would in 
nowise improperly limit the freedom of action of peaceful, law 
abiding persons. The contemplated legislation would not hamper or 
hinder any person from purchasing or possessing a firearm. It 
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would merely require him to register the firearm and to record any 
transfer of the weapon.’”140 
F. POSTSCRIPT 
In the meantime, Miller resurfaced. On April 3, 1939, Miller, 
Robert Drake “Major” Taylor, and an unidentified accomplice 
robbed the Route 66 Club, a Miami, Oklahoma dive.141 Armed with 
shotguns, they stole about $80, superficially wounding two by-
standers in the process.142 Apparently, it was an inside job. Earl 
“Woodenfoot” Clanton, the uncle of notorious bank robbers Her-
man and Ed “Newt” Clanton, owned the bar.143 Taylor was a for-
mer associate of Newt Clanton’s, 144 and a peripheral member of the 
O’Malley Gang.145  
At about 9 a.m. on April 3, two or three men in a car picked 
up Miller at his home in Ketchum, Oklahoma.146 The next day, 
around noon, a farmhand named Fisher discovered Miller’s bullet-
ridden corpse on the bank of the “nearly dry” Little Spencer Creek, 
nine miles southwest of Chelsea, Oklahoma.147 Miller was shot four 
times with a .38, twice in the chest, once under the left arm, and 
once through the left arm. The .45 automatic next to him had been 
fired three times.148 On April 6, someone found Miller’s torched 
1934 sedan off a dirt road in the Verdigris River bottoms, about four 
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miles southeast of Nowata.149 It was stripped and still smoldering. 
A farmer said he saw it burning shortly before noon on April 3.150  
Taylor was a suspect in the investigation.151 On October 8, 
1939, Sheriff Ellis Summers arrested him in Kermit, Texas, after he 
got in a “fight with an oil field worker over a dice game.”152 Ulti-
mately, what happened on April 4 is unclear. Maybe Miller and 
Taylor disputed the proceeds of the robbery.153 Maybe Taylor shot 
Miller for snitching on the O’Malleys.154 In any case, Oklahoma 
charged Taylor with murder, but eventually dropped the charges 
for lack of evidence. Still, he pleaded guilty to armed robbery and 
got ten years in McAlester.155 
On January 8, 1940, Layton pleaded guilty to the reinstated 
NFA charge and Ragon sentenced him to five years probation.156 
Ragon expected an appointment to the Eighth Circuit, but died 
suddenly of a heart attack on September 15, 1940.157 Layton’s proba-
tion ended on January 29, 1944.158 He died in 1967. Both Miller and 
Layton were buried at Woodlawn Cemetery in Claremore, Okla-
homa.159 
III. INTERPRETING UNITED STATES V. MILLER 
Both individual and collective rights theorists claim Miller 
adopted their position. But few Second Amendment scholars spend 
much time analyzing Miller, because few take it seriously. Most 
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assume Justice McReynolds was either uninterested in, or incapable 
of drafting a competent opinion, and dismiss Miller as hopelessly 
opaque.160 However, this consensus reflects the identity of the au-
thor as much as the quality of his opinion.161 Many justices were 
poor draftsmen, but none are as universally despised as 
McReynolds.162 The last of the “Four Horsemen,” he is remembered 
only as a cranky bigot, notorious for shunning Justice Brandeis163 
and referring to blacks as “darkies.”164 Even his own, lone biogra-
pher characterized him as “an easy man to dislike . . . on occasion 
intolerant, cantankerous, and rude.”165  
And yet, McReynolds’s peers were far more charitable.166 
Holmes considered him “acute.”167 Taft described him as “a man of 
real ability, and great sharpness of intellect.” 168  Frankfurter de-
spised him, but respected his abilities.169 Even Brandeis conceded 
that McReynolds “is capable of effective writing.”170 The problem 
was “his studied avoidance of obiter, even when there may have 
been an alluring temptation to catch the public eye by some spec-
tacular utterance.”171 Or rather, his “curious notion that opinions 
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were essentially superfluities anyway, and that the less said, the 
better.”172  
True to form, Miller is quite terse. The nine-page opinion 
consists primarily of lengthy quotations and string cites, anchored 
by a few paragraphs of crabbed analysis. Still, it was not an after-
thought. Chief Justice Hughes usually assigned opinions at the Sat-
urday conference after argument.173  But Hughes fell ill in mid-
March 1939 and did not return to the bench for several weeks, after 
Miller was argued and assigned.174 As the most senior associate, 
McReynolds assigned cases in Hughes’s absence. Apparently, he 
assigned Miller to himself, presumably because he considered it 
important.  
The NFA found an unlikely champion in McReynolds, 
erstwhile foe of federal regulation. While McReynolds was a De-
mocrat, he was no New Dealer. On the contrary, he was a Gold 
Democrat175 who detested Roosevelt and the New Deal alike.176 
And he hated Attorney General Cummings, too. As the architect of 
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan, Cummings added insult to injury 
by citing a superficially similar proposal McReynolds himself ad-
vanced in 1913.177 
McReynolds knew gun control was part of the New Deal 
program. He knew Miller and Layton were gangsters. And he knew 
Miller was a Second Amendment test case. But he barely addressed 
the Second Amendment. Instead, he discussed the nature of the mi-
litia and the history of its governance. And he concluded the Second 
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Amendment does not protect short-barreled shotguns because they 
aren’t militia weapons. 
Oddly, McReynolds began by holding that the NFA does 
not violate the Tenth Amendment by infringing state police power. 
“Considering Sonzinsky v. United States, and what was ruled in sun-
dry causes arising under the Harrison Narcotic Act[,] the objection 
that the Act usurps police power reserved to the States is plainly 
untenable.”178 But Ragon did not reach Miller’s Tenth Amendment 
claim and the government did not brief it, so it was not properly 
before the court. Of course, Sonzinsky did indeed foreclose most 
Tenth Amendment objections to the NFA.179 But McReynolds was 
notoriously punctilious about jurisdiction.180 It is surprising he ad-
dressed the issue at all. 
In fact, McReynolds alone thought the NFA does violate the 
Tenth Amendment. Today, Congress can regulate virtually any-
thing under the Commerce Clause. But when Congress drafted the 
NFA in 1934, the Court prohibited federal regulation of intrastate 
commerce under the Commerce Clause.181 Because Congress could 
not regulate directly under the Commerce Clause, it regulated indi-
rectly under the Tax Clause. For example, the Harrison Narcotics 
Act effectively regulated narcotics by taxing them and enforcing the 
tax. The Supreme Court held such regulatory taxation did not in-
fringe state police power, so long as it produced some revenue.182  
The Four Horsemen and their predecessors disagreed.183 
They conceded Congress can both tax narcotics and punish tax eva-
sion, but argued the Harrison Act is “beyond the constitutional 
power of Congress to enact because to such extent the statute was a 
mere attempt by Congress to exert a power not delegated, that is, 
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the reserved police power of the States.”184 In other words, they 
thought regulatory taxes violate the Tenth Amendment.  
For years, McReynolds continued to object to regulatory 
taxes on Tenth Amendment and due process grounds, gradually 
getting lonelier and lonelier.185 Eventually, even he threw in the 
towel. In 1937, Max Sonzinsky, “a notorious East St. Louis fence,” 
challenged the NFA under the Tenth Amendment.186 McReynolds 
joined the unanimous opinion upholding the law.187 And in Miller, 
he relied on United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,188 United States v. Dore-
mus,189 Linder v. United States,190 Alston v. United States,191 and Nigro 
v. United States,192 the very cases in which he resisted the Harrison 
Act. 
In any case, McReynolds began Miller by emphasizing the 
NFA satisfies the Tenth Amendment only because it is at least 
nominally a tax, rather than a regulation.193 As the government 
pointed out, “even as to this class of firearms there is not a word in 
the National Firearms Act which expressly prohibits the obtaining, 
ownership, possession or transportation thereof by anyone if com-
pliance is had with the provisions relating to registration, the pay-
ment of taxes, and the possession of stamp-affixed orders.”194 So, 
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whatever it holds, Miller does not hold that Congress can regulate 
firearms directly. 
The rejection of Miller’s Tenth Amendment claim highlights 
the implausibility of his Second Amendment claim. Miller could not 
just argue that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to pos-
sess and use NFA firearms. He had to claim it prohibits taxation of 
NFA firearms. Unsurprisingly, McReynolds found this claim un-
convincing. Whether or not the Second Amendment guarantees an 
individual right to keep and bear arms, it hardly prohibits Congress 
from taxing particular weapons.  
McReynolds assumed the Second Amendment guarantees 
the right to keep and bear arms in order to ensure an effective mili-
tia exists. “With obvious purpose to assure the continuation and 
render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and 
guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be inter-
preted and applied with that end in view.”195 In other words, the 
Militia Clause empowers Congress to regulate the militia,196 and the 
Second Amendment ensures it is armed.  
Accordingly, McReynolds devoted most of Miller to analyz-
ing the composition of the militia and the duties of militia service. 
After consulting “the debates in the Convention, the history and 
legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved 
commentators,” he concluded the militia consists of “all males 
physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.”197 
Essentially, everyone subject to conscription.198 “And further, that 
ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to ap-
pear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in com-
mon use at the time.”199 Like the Cooley treatise on which he relied, 
McReynolds assumed the militia “cannot exist unless the people are 
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trained to bearing arms.”200 A militiaman may own a firearm be-
cause he must know how to use one. 
In other words, McReynolds assumed the Second Amend-
ment guarantee ensures those subject to conscription may possess 
weapons suitable for militia service. And he held it does not protect 
NFA firearms as a matter of law, because they aren’t suitable for 
militia service. “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that 
possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen 
inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say 
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear 
such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this 
weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its 
use could contribute to the common defense.”201 A short-barreled 
shotgun is a weapon, but it is not a militia weapon, and the Second 
Amendment only protects militia weapons. 
Essentially, McReynolds adopted the government’s fallback 
argument: the Second Amendment does not protect weapons used 
by criminals.202 McReynolds often worked directly from the briefs, 
incorporating elements from them into his opinions.203 In support of 
his holding in Miller, he cited only Aymette v. State, a Tennessee case 
holding the right “to keep and bear arms” doesn’t guarantee the 
right to carry a concealed bowie knife.204 The government cited Ay-
mette for the proposition that “the term ‘arms’ as used in constitu-
tional provisions refers only to those weapons which are ordinarily 
used for military or public defense purposes and does not relate to 
those weapons which are commonly used by criminals.” 205 
McReynolds agreed, concluding the Second Amendment only pro-
tects weapons reasonably related to militia service, not including 
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short-barreled shotguns. But he did not specify which weapons the 
Second Amendment does protect or how it protects them. 
McReynolds also adopted the government’s argument that 
the Second Amendment did not create a right, but guaranteed a 
pre-constitutional common law right. “The Second Amendment 
does not confer upon the people the right to keep and bear arms; it is 
one of the provisions of the Constitution which, recognizing the 
prior existence of a certain right, declares that it shall not be in-
fringed by Congress.”206 Notably, McReynolds’s analysis of the mi-
litia relied exclusively on pre-ratification sources.207 And he closed 
by linking the Second Amendment guarantee to state constitutional 
guarantees. “Most if not all of the States have adopted provisions 
touching the right to keep and bear arms. Differences in the lan-
guage employed in these have naturally led to somewhat variant 
conclusions concerning the scope of the right guaranteed. But none 
of them seem to afford any material support for the challenged rul-
ing of the court below.”208 Apparently, McReynolds assumed the 
scope of the Second Amendment guarantee depends upon the rele-
vant state constitution. Or at the very least, the guarantees incorpo-
rated into the state constitutions illuminate the scope of the right 
guaranteed by the Second Amendment.  
Of course, McReynolds generally assumed the Constitution 
simply protects common law rights. As he memorably put it in 
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Constitution guarantees “not merely freedom 
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, 
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire use-
ful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and 
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law 
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as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”209 And 
it protects those common law rights against federal and state gov-
ernments alike. “As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has 
no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of 
the State.”210 And “liberty may not be interfered with, under the 
guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is 
arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the 
competency of the State to effect.”211  
Basically, McReynolds believed in a reasonable Constitu-
tion. And a reasonable Constitution permits reasonable regulation. 
So the Second Amendment protects a weapon only if its possession 
and use “has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or 
efficiency of a well regulated militia.”212 In other words, Miller held 
the common law right to keep and bear arms only protects weapons 
related to militia service, not including NFA firearms.213 Congress 
can tax NFA firearms because the Second Amendment doesn’t pro-
tect them. But Miller did not explain what makes a weapon related 
to militia service. Nor did it explicitly adopt an individual or collec-
tive right theory of the Second Amendment. It did not have to. The 
NFA was reasonable on either theory, as it affected only unpro-
tected weapons. 
Some individual right theorists argue Miller held the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and bear 
any weapon with a military use. They claim the Court upheld the 
NFA only because Miller failed to present any evidence of the many 
military uses of short-barreled shotguns, including trench and jun-
gle warfare. 214  But machine guns obviously had military uses. 
Surely Miller did not invalidate the NFA tax on machine guns sub 
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silentio.215 As the First Circuit recognized three years later in Cases 
v. United States, “the rule of the Miller case . . . would seem to be 
already outdated . . . because of the well known fact that in the so-
called ‘Commando Units’ some sort of military use seems to have 
been found for almost any modern lethal weapon,” including short-
barreled shotguns.216 
Indeed, the government implicitly conceded NFA firearms 
have military uses. “It may be assumed that Congress, in inserting 
these provisions in the National Firearms Act, intended, through 
the exercise of its taxing power and its power to regulate interstate 
and foreign commerce, to discourage, except for military and law 
enforcement purposes, the traffic in and utilization of the weapons 
to which the Act refers.” 217  It nevertheless argued the Second 
Amendment does not protect NFA firearms because they “form the 
arsenal of the gangster and desperado.”218 
The Miller Court agreed, concluding “it is not within judi-
cial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military 
equipment or that its use could contribute to the common de-
fense.”219 While short-barreled shotguns, machine guns, and silenc-
ers may have military uses, they aren’t appropriate for militia ser-
vice. Nor will civilian use help preserve the peace. Relying on Ay-
mette, the Miller Court assumed the Second Amendment only pro-
tects the right to possess weapons “usually employed in civilized 
warfare,” not “those weapons which are usually employed in pri-
vate broils, and which are efficient only in the hands of the robber 
and the assassin.”220  
Of course, short-barreled shotguns do have legitimate civil-
ian uses, primarily protection and hunting small game. Pre-NFA, 
firearms manufacturers had long produced short-barreled shot-
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guns, or their functional equivalent.221 However, Miller’s gun was 
homemade, as Stevens never produced a shotgun with a barrel 
shorter than 18 inches. And in any case, Miller assumed taxation, 
regulation, or even prohibition of NFA firearms is reasonable 
whether or not they have legitimate civilian uses. As is taxation, 
regulation, and prohibition of many other varieties of firearm. 
Miller assumed the Second Amendment only guarantees the right 
to possess and use a firearm suitable for militia service, not any par-
ticular firearm. 
Some collective right theorists argue Miller held the Second 
Amendment only protects a collective right to form a militia, or 
even a state’s right to maintain a militia. 222  Many courts have 
agreed.223 But this reading is plainly untenable, because the Miller 
Court assumed Miller and Layton had standing to assert an indi-
vidual right of some kind. 
Arguably, an individual could assert a collective right to 
participate in militia service.224 But Miller did not challenge the 
NFA as a limitation on his right to participate in militia service. He 
challenged his indictment for transporting an untaxed NFA firearm 
in interstate commerce. And the Court evaluated Miller’s right to 
possess and use a particular firearm, not his right to join the militia. 
Everyone knew Miller and Layton were criminals, and unlikely mi-
litiamen. They certainly were not pinched during a muster. But the 
Court did not ask whether Miller and Layton intended to partici-
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pate in militia service. It only asked whether the Second Amend-
ment protects NFA firearms. 
Furthermore, McReynolds adopted a colloquial reading of 
the Second Amendment guarantee. Second Amendment scholars 
dispute the original meaning of the terms “keep” and “bear.” Indi-
vidual right theorists claim “keep” meant private ownership.225 Col-
lective right theorists claim both terms meant military use.226 But 
McReynolds assumed “keep” means “possess” and “bear” means 
“use.”227 And “to possess and use” a weapon implies private own-
ership. Basically, McReynolds adopted a traditional, commonsense 
interpretation of the Second Amendment, assuming it guarantees 
an individual right to possess and use firearms, subject to reason-
able regulation of time, place, and manner.228 
Alternatively, a cynic could dismiss Miller as simply hold-
ing the Constitution doesn’t protect criminals. When the Supreme 
Court upheld the NFA in Sonzinsky, “Government attorneys hailed 
the decision as a material aid in the war against gangsters and 
gunmen.”229 And as a former Attorney General, McReynolds surely 
appreciated the convenience of laws like the NFA. After all, every-
one knew Miller and Layton were gangsters, and “a right exercised 
in morality” cannot “sustain a right to be exercised in immorality.230  
But McReynolds would not have gone along. Sure, he was a 
bigot. But he was a principled bigot. And his principles demanded 
neutrality. “That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in or-
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der to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and 
morally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights 
which must be respected.”231 For instance, he objected to the Harri-
son Act not only because he thought it infringed state police power, 
but also because he thought it violated due process by shifting the 
burden of proof to the accused.232 While the government generally 
prosecuted only junkies and dealers, the Harrison Act permitted it 
to prosecute anyone it liked. And lots of people owned narcotics 
they purchased before Congress passed the Harrison Act.233 
Ultimately, the Miller Court’s reading of the Second 
Amendment simply reflected popular sentiment and conventional 
wisdom. In 1939, the federal government promoted widespread 
firearms ownership, providing surplus military rifles to the public 
in order to ensure civilians knew how to use firearms.234 And most 
scholars assumed the Second Amendment guarantees an individual 
right to possess and use firearms, subject to reasonable regula-
tion.235 
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CONCLUSION 
So what did Miller hold? At a minimum, it held the Second 
Amendment permits Congress to tax firearms used by criminals. At 
the maximum, dicta suggest the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to possess and use a weapon suitable for militia 
service. And in general, it implies the Second Amendment permits 
reasonable regulation of firearms. In any event, the Court left legis-
lators a lot of wiggle room. 
But what does Miller tell us about the meaning of the Sec-
ond Amendment? Maybe nothing. Some believe precedent cannot 
bind the Constitution of a sovereign people.236 Others believe the 
original meaning of a constitutional provision always trumps 
precedent.237 Still others believe in an instrumental Constitution, to 
which precedent supplies only the contingent value of stability.238 
Nevertheless, faint-hearted originalists 239  and incrementalists 240 
alike might find Miller useful, or even appealing. After all, it antici-
pates the status quo: federal, state, and local governments may rea-
sonably regulate firearms, but may not prohibit them altogether. In 
other words, maybe McReynolds got it right, at least this once. 
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